组织治理规则实施的影响机制——基于中国C行业协会的个案研究  

The Mechanism of Organizational Governance Rules:a Case-study of Industrial Association C in China

作　　者：田凯[1] Tian Kai(Associate Professor at School of Government, Peking University. Beijing 100871)

机构地区：[1]北京大学政府管理学院

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2017年第10期69-76,共8页Chinese Public Administration

摘　　要：组织治理规则是组织理论中一个重要但尚待发展的研究主题。本文综合运用组织分析新制度主义和新制度经济学的相关理论,以对中国C行业协会的观察分析为基础,构建了解释组织治理规则实施影响机制的理论模型。研究发现,组织治理规则实施实质上是组织内外多元参与者的博弈过程,参与者的权力地位、利益和效用函数对规则实施有着重要影响。不同参与者的群体规模、群体内部信息沟通程度、群体凝聚力及群体认同程度决定了参与者能否采取集体行动,进而影响规则实施程度。治理规则的起源方式是影响规则实施的一个重要因素,内生性规则通常更具可实施性。参与者具有充分信息是治理规则实施的关键因素,行动者对信息的占有是权力实施的基础。对参与者的激励是规则实施的必要条件。The decoupling of the enforcement with formal governance rules is an important phenomenon. Based on the organizational institutionalism and the institutional economics, this paper develops a theoretical model to explain the factors that affect the enforcement of governance rules by the observation to industrial association C in China. The research finds that the enforcement of governance rules is a game process among multiple participants with different power, status, interests and utility functions. The group size, the information communication, the solidarity and the identification of participants will determine whether they can take collective actions and then can influence the enforcement of rules. The origination of rules, the information owned by participants and the incentives to participants are other key factors that determine the degree of the enforcement of rules.

关 键 词：治理 规则 自我实施 第三方实施 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]