供应链环境中中小企业安全生产的激励契约  

Work safety incentive contract to small and medium sized enterprises in supply chain environment

作　　者：周巧梅[1] 梅强[1] 刘素霞[1] ZHOU Qiaomei MEI Qiang LIU Suxia(School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang Jiangsu 212013, China)

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《中国安全科学学报》2017年第7期145-150,共6页China Safety Science Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助(71373104;71403108)

摘　　要：为改善供应链内中小企业的安全生产状况,剖析中小企业与其供应链内核心企业的委托-代理关系,并构建双任务委托-代理框架下的中小企业安全生产激励契约模型。结合数值仿真,分析模型中的激励参数、中小企业生产与安全任务努力水平及核心企业收益得出:核心企业对中小企业生产任务的激励明显大于对安全任务的激励;核心企业帮助中小企业降低其安全成本或增加其安全边际收益,必将在更大程度上提高其安全任务努力水平;核心企业援助链上中小企业,使其降低生产及安全成本,也有利于核心企业自身。To improve the situation of work safety of small and medium-sized enterprises in China,the principal-agent relationships between the enterprises and core enterprises in supply chain were analyzed and an incentive contract model was built for safety of small and medium-sized enterprises under the dual task principal-agent framework condition. Incentive parameters,the effort level of small and medium enterprise production and safety tasks and the return of core enterprise were analyzed by using a numerical simulation method. The results show that the incentive of the core enterprise to the production tasks of small and medium-sized enterprises is obviously greater than that to the safety tasks that reducing the safety costs of small and medium-sized enterprises or increasing their safety marginal revenue with core enterprise’s help will increase their effort to a greater extent in performing the safety task,and that if a core enterprise helps the small and medium-sized enterprises to reduce their production and safety costs,the core enterprise’s own income will increase.

关 键 词：安全生产 双任务委托-代理 激励契约 供应链 中小企业 

分 类 号：X922[环境科学与工程—安全科学]