认知态度的内容:命题论与属性论辨析  

The Content of Cognitive Attitudes: The Debate between Propositionalism and the Property Theory

作　　者：陶孝云 

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第5期35-41,共7页Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(11&ZD187);江苏省社会科学基金青年项目(16ZXC005);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(2062014261)

摘　　要：信念等认知态度通常被认为是主体与命题间的一种关系,并且它们的内容也被认为是具有真假值的命题。但是这种观念却无法为从己信念的内容找到恰当的命题。而对"行为解释论证"和"两个上帝论证"的重构,可以说明从己信念问题的解决需要我们放弃关于信念等认知态度的主导观念——命题教条,即信念是主体与具有真假值的命题之间的关系,转而主张属性论,即信念是主体与自我归属的属性之间的关系。在考察了命题主义者对"两个上帝论证"及属性论的主要反驳后,就更有理由坚持属性论。Belief and other cognitive attitudes are usually considered as relations between subjects and propositions,and the contents of these attitudes are always considered as propositions with true or false value.However,this view cannot identify the appropriate proposition as the content of belief de se. On reconstructing the argument of explanation of behavior and the two gods argument,it is argued that the resolution of problem of belief de se requires us to refute the doctrine of propositions in the notion of belief and other cognitive attitudes,and maintain that belief is the relation between subjects and the properties self-ascribed. By reviewing the major arguments from the propositionalists against the two gods argument and property theory,it is the property theory that we should insist on to characterize the cognitive attitudes.

关 键 词：认知态度 从己信念 内容 命题教条 属性论 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]