政府补贴对国有资本配置的双重效应  

The Double Effect of Government Subsidies on the Allocation of State-Owned Capital

作　　者：刘剑民 

机构地区：[1]湖南科技大学商学院

出　　处：《中国社会科学院研究生院学报》2017年第5期52-59,共8页Journal of Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

基　　金：教育部高校人文社会科学研究项目(12YJA630073)的资助

摘　　要：政府补贴对国有资本配置存在积极与消极双重影响。本文通过对国有上市公司资本配置效率的行业效应分析,发现政府补贴对国有资本配置的积极效应强于消极效应。政府补贴作为政府的"扶持之手",一定程度上提高了国有资本配置效率或实现政府诉求,对科研与信息技术业补贴效果相对较好;对农业补贴主要实现国家战略等政府诉求;对交通运输业补贴体现效益与普遍服务的均衡。但是,政府补贴的消极效应造成企业的补贴依赖与资本错配等低效率行为,降低国有资本的配置效率。基于行业效应分析,本文认为结构性财政补贴政策有利于国有资本优化配置。Government subsidies have both positive and negative influences on the allocation of state-owned capital. Based on an analysis of the industry effects of state-owned listed companies on the capital allocation efficiency, this paper finds that overall the positive effects oI government subsidies on state-owned capital allocation is stronger than negative effect. As a ＂supportive hand＂, government subsidies improve the efficiency of state-owned capital allocation or implement the government＇s demands to some extent： the subsidy effect on scientific researches and on the information technology industry is relatively positive; the subsidies to agricultural enterprises achieve the government＇s pursuits such as national strat- egy; the subsidies to the transportation industry embody the balance between efficiency and universal service. However, government subsidies also have negative effects： they result in inefficient corporate behaviors such as subsidy dependence and capital mismatch, which re- duce the allocation efficiency of state-owned capital. On the basis of this industry effect anal- ysis, the author believes that structural fiscal subsidy policies are beneficial to the optimiza- tion of the allocation of state-owned capital.

关 键 词：政府补贴 国有企业 国有资本配置效率政府诉求 

分 类 号：F123.7[经济管理—世界经济] F812.45