分析师预测存在信息披露的“功能锁定”吗?  

Does Analysts' Predictions Exist the “Function Fixation” of Information Disclosure?

作　　者：徐向艺[1,2] 高传贵 方政[3] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100 [2]山东大学公司治理研究中心,山东济南250100 [3]山东大学管理科学与工程博士后流动站,山东济南250100

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2017年第10期136-142,共7页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272120);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2016M592205);山东省博士后创新项目(201603020)

摘　　要：文章研究了分析师预测中潜在"功能锁定"的影响,并引入生命周期理论,以探究企业发展阶段的不同是否对上述二者关系存在差异化影响。主要研究结果:高质量的上市公司会计信息能够提升分析师预测的估值水平,并且降低预测偏差,同时公司治理信息的完备性正向调节分析师预测与会计信息质量的关系;公司治理信息的调节作用在成熟期或衰退期组更加显著。研究结果表明,在目前中国资本市场,分析师预测存在过于依赖会计信息的"功能锁定"倾向,并针对这一问题提出了旨在增强公司治理信息"信号"功能的政策建议。This paper studies the potential effect of＂function fixation＂in analysts＇ predictions about corporate performance, and discusses whether there are differences in the relationship between information disclosure and analysts＇ predictions at different stages of enter-prise development by introducing the theory of life cycle. The main results are： High quality accounting information of listed companiescan enhance the valuation level of analysts＇ predictions. Moreover, the prediction deviation is reduced, and the completeness of corporategovernance information positively regulates the relationship between analysts＇ predictions and accounting information quality; The moder-ating effects of corporate governance information are more significant in mature or declining firms. This paper shows that there exists a ten-dencyin analysts＇ predictions in the context of China＇s capital market, which is overly dependent on＂function fixation＂of accounting in-formation, and proposes some policy suggestions aimed at enhancing the ＂signal＂ function of corporate governance information.

关 键 词：分析师预测 功能锁定 会计信息 公司治理信息 生命周期理论 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学] F275