纵向博弈、横向竞争与地方政府举债融资及其治理  

Logitudinal Game,Horizontal Competition and Local Government Debt Financing and Governance

作　　者：刁伟涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛理工大学经贸学院,山东青岛266520

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2017年第5期87-94,共8页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目"分类限额管理下地方政府债务防风险与稳增长的平衡协调机制研究"(17BJY169)

摘　　要：本文以中央与地方间的纵向博弈和地方政府间的横向竞争为理论框架,分析了地方政府举借债务的动因,基于空间面板模型的实证结果显示,信息不对称使中央政府对于地方政府的举债行为并没有形成强力有效的约束,而地方政府间的横向竞争则进一步加剧了债务规模的扩张。同时,地方政府举借债务也存在财政分权的体制因素,这集中体现在其举债规模与财力状况相关,而不同财力构成对于举债规模影响存在异质性:一般公共财力是正向影响,而政府性基金财力则是负向影响,显示出地方政府主动举债和被动举债是同时存在的。上述论断为地方政府举债融资的管控治理提供了一定的启示。Based on the framework of longitudinal game between central and local governments and horizontal competition between local governments,this paper analyzes the reasons of local government debt’s expanding.The empirical result based on the spatial panel model shows that the central government has not exerted a strong and effective restraint on the borrowing behavior of local governments due to asymmetric information,while the horizontal competition between local governments further exacerbated debt expansion.At the same time,local government borrowing debt is also affected by the institutional factors of fiscal decentralization,which is mainly reflected by the relevance between its debt size and financial position.While the influence of different financial structure on debt scale is heterogeneous,that is,general revenue has positive influence on local debt and government-managed funds income has negative one.It shows that the active and passive local government debt exist at the same time.Under the New Budget Law,these conclusions provide some advices for control and governance of local government debt.

关 键 词：地方政府债务 纵向博弈 横向竞争 地方财力 空间面板模型 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学]