二手房交易讨价还价博弈模型  

Bargain game models of the second-hand housing commence

作　　者：汪瑞 李登峰[1] Wang Rui Li Dengfeng(School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116, China School of Business Management, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou 350108, China)

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350116 [2]福建江夏学院工商管理学院,福建福州350108

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2017年第5期588-595,共8页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71231003);福建省中青年教师教育科研资助项目(JAS150641)

摘　　要：研究了二手房市场的买卖双方为确定待交易房屋最终售价进行的讨价还价问题.通过分别建立了无限期和有限期情形下的二手房交易双方讨价还价博弈模型,求解无限期时买卖双方的子博弈完备均衡解,在此基础上,对博弈时间加以限制,求解有限期时买卖双方在第二阶段的博弈均衡解,同时还构建了多次博弈模型并对某一具体交易时点的博弈过程进行了讨论.研究表明,博弈结果取决于买卖双方贴现因子之比;双方对时间和惩罚的约定使卖方的成本加大,进而使最终报价只能在一定范围内有效,而这个报价的取值范围与卖方每轮报价成本、博弈次数及惩罚成本等紧密相关.The aim of this paper is to discuss a bargaining problem between sellers and buyers in the final price of the houses for sale in the second-hand house market. Two bargaining models are established for the sellers and buyers in an indefinite period and finite period respectively. For the indefinite period, the complete equilibrium solution of the bargaining game between the buyers and sellers is obtained. Hereby, imposing some constraints on the time, the equilibrium solution on the second stage is obtained. At the same time, a multiple game model is constructed and the commence point is discussed. The result shows that the game between sellers and buyers depends on the ratio of each one＇s discount factor; Beyond that, the time and commitment between sellers and buyers increase the sellers＇ cost, hence the final price can only be implemented within a certain range, which is related with the proposal cost of sellers, the number of games, and the punishment cost in each round.

关 键 词：二手房交易 均衡 讨价还价 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F293.35[经济管理—国民经济]