论提名股东对提名董事利益输送的补充责任  

On the Supplementary Liability of Norminee Shareholders to Avoid Tunneling by Norminee Directors

作　　者：孙光焰[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南民族大学法学院

出　　处：《广西民族大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2017年第5期176-182,共7页JOURNAL OF GUANGXI MINZU UNIVERSITY:PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE EDITION

摘　　要：董事的出身决定了其所代表的特定利益,并成为特定利益群体的代言人。现行公司法无视董事这一自然属性,强制赋予董事一些不切实际的义务,导致董事无所适从,从而影响了公司治理的效率。应当明确规定董事在其履行职务时违反法律规定给公司及其他利益相关者造成损害时,应由董事承担赔偿责任,并由其提名人承担补充赔偿责任。应明确落实每位董事候选人的提名人,从而将每位董事与其提名人的利益和责任绑定。这一方面在董事会内各位董事将各为其主有助于形成一种利益制衡机制,形成透明决策,保障决策质量,提高决策效率;另一方面追究提名人的补充责任将对大股东利用董事会损害小股东利益的行为形成有力的威慑,从而遏制利益输送。The origin of a director determines the specific interests he represents and the specific interest group he speaks for. The current company law has unfortunately disregarded such a natural characteristic and imposed certain impractical obligations upon directors, which distracts the directors and results in poor efficiency of corporate governance. The law should clearly provide that if a nominee director breaks provisions of laws and causes damages to the company and other stakeholders when he performs his duty, he should bear the liability for compensation and his norminer should bear the liability for supplementary compensation. Therefore, every director candidate should be fixed to a norminer in order to bind their interests and duties. The practice that every director of the board is responsible for his norminer helps to form a balanced interest mechanism and a transparent procedure of decision--making, to guarantee the quality of decisions and to improve the efficiency of decisions; meanwhile, the accountability to norminers＇ supplementary liability will impose powerful deterrent on the practice of major shareholders damaging minor shareholders＇ interests in the name of the board, and will eventually contain the tunneling.

关 键 词：公司治理 提名董事 提名股东 

分 类 号：DF411.91[政治法律—经济法学]