国有企业政治关联与现金价值关系研究  

A Study on the Relationship between Political Connections and the Value of Cash Holdings in State-owned Enterprise

作　　者：马丽华[1] 陈伟华[1] 米新丽[2] 赵雪燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北大学经济学院,河北保定071002 [2]河北大学管理学院,河北保定071002

出　　处：《河北科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第3期16-23,共8页Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology:Social Sciences

基　　金：河北省社会科学基金项目(HB16YJ011)

摘　　要：以2006年至2013年间沪深A股非金融类国有上市公司为研究样本,考察了政治关联与公司现金价值之间的关系。研究发现,国有上市公司政治关联与现金价值具有显著的负相关关系,而且政治关联强度的增加会进一步损害现金价值;政治关联对中央国有上市公司的现金价值没有显著的影响,对地方国有上市公司的现金价值则有显著的负向影响。因此,应改革国有企业的高管选任机制,加强对地方国有企业的监管,从而抑制政治关联代理冲突效应的发挥。This paper chose A-share non-financial firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2013and explored the relationship of political connections and the value of corporate cash holdings.The results show that political connection has significantly negative effects on the value of cash holdings of state-owned firms,and a higher degree of political connection further undermines the value of cash holdings.The research also suggests that political connection does not significantly reduce the cash value of central state-owned firms,but it has a significant negative correlation with the cash value of local state-owned firms.The research has an important policy implication.The mechanism of executive selection of state-owned firms should be reformed and the supervision of local state-owned firms should be strengthened,thereby restraining the effect of agency conflicts.

关 键 词：国有企业 政治关联 现金价值 代理冲突 

分 类 号：D267.1[政治法律—政治学]