混合所有制企业的股东利益冲突、股权混合模式与公司绩效  

Shareholders Interest Conflicts,Equity Mixed Pattern and Corporate Performance of Mixed Ownership Companies

作　　者：黄建欢[1] 李卓霖 尹筑嘉[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079 [2]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙410114

出　　处：《湖南大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第1期68-74,共7页Journal of Hunan University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社科基金项目:"混合所有制企业国有与非国有大股东之间的利益冲突及其治理研究"(15BGL041);湖南省社科基金项目:"大股东异质性及其利益均衡研究"(15YBA014);湖南省2011"现代服务业发展与湖南新型城镇化"协同创新中心资助课题

摘　　要：以2009-2015年沪市A股中的混合所有制企业为研究样本,通过构建持股近似度和持股关注度两个新指标,研究混合所有制企业中不同身份属性大股东之间的利益冲突状况及其对公司绩效的影响。结果发现:总体上,混合所有制企业中的大股东利益冲突与公司绩效负相关,且不同的股权混合模式对公司绩效的影响也不同。国有大股东和非国有大股东持股比例差距适中的股权混合模式有利于提升公司绩效;两类股东持股比例差异过大或过小的股权混合模式均不利于提高公司绩效。因此,在混合所有制改革过程中,不宜过分强调异质性股东间的制衡作用,而应通过合理设计股权混合模式,有效化解大股东利益冲突,更好地发挥国有资本和非国有资本各自的优势。In this paper,we select mixed ownership companies from the A-shares in Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2009 — 2015 as the samples.By building two new indexes:the degree of shareholding approximation and the degree of shareholding of attention,we explore the interest conflicts among large shareholders caused by the difference of identity in the mixed ownership companies and its impact on corporate performances.The results show that;overall,there is a negative relationship between large shareholders' interest conflicts and corporate performances in the mixed ownership companies,and the impact of different equity mixed modes on corporate performance is also different.Moderate shareholding ratio gap of large state-owned shareholders and large non-state-owned shareholders is conductive to improve corporate performances.But if the gap is too large or too small,it will not be conducive to improve corporate performances.Thus,in the process of the mixed ownership reform,there is too much emphasis on heterogeneity,and balance among large shareholders is not necessary.Instead,the rational design of equity hybrid mode more effectively resolves conflicts of interest among large shareholders and takes better advantage of state-owned and non-state capital.

关 键 词：混合所有制 大股东异质性 利益冲突 股权混合模式 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]