一种面向团购的分配与定价机制  

Allocation and pricing mechanism oriented to group-buying

作　　者：姜艺[1] 吴静 朱泽宇 朱俊武[1,3] 李斌[1,4] 

机构地区：[1]扬州大学信息工程学院,江苏扬州225127 [2]广西师范学院计算机与信息工程学院,广西南宁530023 [3]圭尔夫大学计算机科学学院 [4]南京大学软件新技术国家重点实验室,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《南京理工大学学报》2017年第5期602-609,共8页Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61472344;61170201);江苏省前瞻性科技项目(BY2015061-06;BY2015061-08)

摘　　要：在团购中,对商品有不同数量需求的买家可以通过形成一个具有共同利益的联盟来增强与商家的谈判协商能力。为了解决在团购联盟内买家收益分配不均的问题,该文在最大化联盟收益和最大化联盟成交量两种不同联盟形成方案的基础上,提出了分段式的买家收益分配机制和真实报价的贡献支付机制。其中分段式分配机制能够根据买家的报价进行分段,使得买家获得的收益与其为联盟的贡献度成正比,贡献支付机制中买家实际支付的费用是其对联盟的贡献。从理论上分析了两种机制能够同时满足个体理性、预算平衡、真实报价和公平性等的良好属性。实验结果表明,该文提出的自保护定价函数满足了卖家收益单调递增的性质,保证了卖家的收益不会随卖出商品数量的增大而减少。Buyers with different requirements can enhance their ability with sellers by forming a common-utility coalition in group-buying. In order to solve the problem of uneven utility distribution in the group-buying coalition, the subsection utility distribution mechanism and the truthful paymentmechanism based on the coalition formed by the max-utility of coalition and the max-deal of coalition are proposed here. In the subsection distribution mechanism,the buyer’s u t i l ity is proportional to its contribution to the coalition. In the truthful contribution payment mechanism, the cost of each buyer is its contribution to the coalition. The theoretical analysis reveals individual rationality, budget- balance, truthful and fairness of the two mechanisms. Experimental results show that the self-protection pricing function satisfies the nature of the increasing of the seller income and can guarantees that the seller income does not decease with the increase of the goods selling.

关 键 词：团购 定价函数 联盟 定价机制 收益分配 

分 类 号：TP399[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]