随机产出与随机需求下TPL介入的农产品供应链协调  

Coordination of agri-products supply chain with TPL's participation under random yield and random demand

作　　者：冯颖[1] 余云龙[1] 张炎治[1] 吴茜[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2017年第4期156-163,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101147);中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(20110491477);江苏省博士后科研基金资助计划(1101111C);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2013W12)

摘　　要：针对供应商、TPL服务商和零售商组成的农产品三级供应链,建立了随机产出与随机需求情形下供应商强主导、TPL服务商弱主导的三方序贯非合作博弈模型。结果表明:序贯非合作博弈模式下,零售商的最优订购量与TPL服务商的最优物流服务水平的比值低于集中决策模式下对应的结果,而供应商的计划满足率在两种决策模式下保持不变,系统期望利润出现损失。依次引入批发价格和物流服务价格出清合同,证明了成员的期望利润均为集中决策模式下系统期望利润的映射函数,故供应链实现完美协调,且当合同参数满足特定条件时,系统实现帕累托改善。最后,运用算例对供应商的单位外购成本进行灵敏度分析,发现其计划满足率及成员的期望利润均随外购成本增加而增加。We consider a three-echelon agri-products supply chain composed of a supplier, a third-party logistics（TPL） provider and a retailer, in which the supplier produces agri-products, through the TPL provider, to a terminal market where the retailer purchases and sells them to end customers. The yield of the supplier and the market demand which is sensitive to the logistics service level are both random. We set up a sequential non-cooperative game model where the supplier acts as a strong-leader and the TPL provider acts as a weak-leader. Then, we study the optimal ordering quantity, logistics service level and planning input quantity decisions under the centralized decision-making mode and the sequential non-cooperative game mode, respectively. We find that the optimal decisions of members in the two modes both exist. The ratio between the retailer’s optimal ordering quantity and the TPL provider’s optimal logistics service level is lower than the corresponding result under the centralized decision-making mode while the supplier’s planning fill rates are equal under the both modes. Thus, the expected profit is distorted under the sequential non-cooperative game mode. Interestingly, the optimal ordering quantity, logistics service level and planning input quantity of the sequential non-cooperative game mode are less than the corresponding results of the centralized decision-making mode when the basis market demand subjects to uniform distribution and the marginal profit of the retailer is not less than that of the TPL provider. To coordinate this three-echelon supply chain, we introduce a wholesale-market clearance contract between the supplier and the retailer and a transport-market clearance contract between the TPL provider and the retailer sequentially, which is based on the principle of risk-sharing and profit-sharing. As these contracts lead the members’ expected profit function to be mapping functions of the supply chain expected profit function under centralized decision-making mode, the optimal or

关 键 词：随机产出 随机需求 TPL服务商 序贯非合作博弈 农产品供应链协调 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]