地区腐败、供应链特征与审计师选择  

Political Corruption,Supply Chain Characteristics and Auditor Choice

作　　者：吴晓晖[1] 李卿云[1] 杨风[1] 王行 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2017年第6期11-21,共11页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71572167)

摘　　要：使用2003—2014年我国A股上市公司的数据,研究地区腐败对公司审计师选择的影响以及供应链特征对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现,地区腐败越严重,该地区的企业越不可能聘用代表高审计质量的国际"四大"会计师事务所。与国有企业相比,非国有企业中,地区腐败对企业审计师选择有更强烈的负向影响。此外,供应商集中度和客户集中度会加剧地区腐败与审计师选择的负向关系。供应链特征的调节作用主要体现在国有企业中,在非国有企业中调节作用不显著。Auditor choice is one of the most important issues in the field of auditing, accounting and economics. Using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2014, this paper studies the impact of political corruption on the auditor choice,and investigates how the supply chain characteristics influence the former relationship. The results showthain more corruptive areas are less lilcely to hire the high-quality auditor, such as the Big-^4 auditors.sociation between political corruption and auditor choice is larger among the non-SOEs than the SOEs. Furtliermoreer concentration and the cusomer concentration can b o h obviously mediate the negative association beween corruption and au-ditor choice in the whole sample and the SOEs. H ow e v r , they lost thieir magic in the non- SOEs. Overall, the evidence is con-sistent withi the hypothiesis that thie corruptive local officials can ruin the qualities of firms, accounting information.

关 键 词：地区腐败 供应链特征 供应商集中度 客户集中度 审计师选择 审计质量 审计意见 会计信息质量 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]