Gresham法则与柠檬市场理论对我国农产品适用性的讨论——基于演化博弈的分析  

Adaptability of Gresham Law and Lemon Market Theory to China's Agricultural Products: An Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：彭军 乔慧[2] 郑风田[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国邮政储蓄银行博士后科研工作站,北京100808 [2]中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院,北京100872

出　　处：《农林经济管理学报》2017年第5期573-587,共15页Journal of Agro-Forestry Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173225)

摘　　要：基于生产者-消费者视角,运用演化博弈方法对我国农产品市场的演化路径进行深入分析。研究发现:在演化博弈论的分析框架下,Gresham法则和柠檬市场理论并不严格适用我国农产品市场。只有当消费者把自己按照购买力核定的选票都投向低质量农产品时,整个农产品市场才会堕入低质量的陷阱。消费者只有通过为优质农产品生产者提供价格激励,而不是一味苛求生产者才能解决我国农产品市场的质量困境。同时也要求竞争性信息披露市场氛围的形成,为消费者提供对称的农产品质量信息。From the producers-consumers perspective,evolutionary game theory was adopted to analyze the evolution trend of agricultural products market in China. The research found that in the analysis framework of the evolutionary game theory,the Gresham rule and the lemon market theory are not literally applicable to the agricultural product market in China.The whole market will fall into the trap of low quality only when consumers cast their votes for low quality agricultural products in accordance with their purchasing power. It is vital that consumers be responsible for their own willingness to pay instead of asking producers to provide cheap and good agricultural products.Meanwhile,it is necessary that the market disclose competitive information to provide consumers with symmetrical agricultural product quality information.

关 键 词：农产品市场 逆向选择 柠檬市场 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F304.2[经济管理—产业经济]