虚拟货币发放的进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Virtual Currency Issuance

作　　者：余孝军 高辰 

机构地区：[1]贵州财经大学数统学院,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《邵阳学院学报（自然科学版）》2017年第5期1-7,共7页Journal of Shaoyang University：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71761005)

摘　　要：针对虚拟货币发放问题中各博弈方的策略选择进行了进化博弈分析。首先,构建了虚拟货币发放企业间及虚拟货币发放企业和监管部门间的进化博弈模型及与之对应的复制动态方程,在对复制动态方程的分析基础上得到了博弈模型中各博弈方的进化稳定策略。研究表明企业所获的超额收益,监管部门的监管力度以及惩罚力度等将影响企业的策略选择;监管部门的监管成本、企业的策略选择等影响着虚拟货币市场的监管成效。并根据所构造的进化博弈模型,提出相应建议。The strategy choice of players in virtual currency issuance problem was investigated by evolutionary game theory.A game model among the virtual currency enterprise and a game between the virtual currency enterprise and the management department was presented, respectively. Then, the duplicative dynamic equations of these games were formulated and solved for stable solutions. Various evolutionary stable strategies were obtained of the players.It is show that the strategy choice of enterprise depends on the excess payoff, supervision and punishes.The effect of the virtual currency market supervision depends on the cost of supervision and the strategy choice of enterprise.Some reasonable advices based on the evolutionary game models are proposed.

关 键 词：虚拟货币 货币发放 进化博弈 复制动态方程 进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]