科技补贴政策的微观效率研究——基于企业寻租动机的分析与验证  

Research on Micro-efficiency of Science and Technology Subsidy Policy—— Analysis and verification of enterprise rent seeking motivation

作　　者：李连华[1] 张祎青 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《贵州省党校学报》2017年第6期39-48,共10页Journal of Guizhou Provincial Party School

基　　金：国家社科基金重点课题"基于内部控制视角的腐败防控机制与实现路径研究"(课题编号:15AJY002)的研究成果

摘　　要：在科技补贴政策的微观效率研究上,基于挤入或者挤出效应研究者文献较多,但是基于寻租视角研究者却甚少,亦或有忽视。本文通过寻租视角分析和研究了政府科技补贴的微观创新效率。结果证实,在寻租企业中科技补贴未能达到预期的政策效应,企业的科技创新效率没并有显著提升。进一步的研究结果表明,寻租企业在获得科技补贴后其在职消费显著增加,这意味着企业可能挪用或者减少了原本用于研发的投入资金。本文结论的政策含义是,腐败治理和科技创新并非两个完全无关的领域,腐败治理能够在净化社会政治环境的同时提高科技补贴政策的微观创新效率。In the study of the micro - efficiency of subsidy policy of science and technology, there are many literatures based on the crowding in or crowding out effect , but there is little or no at-tention from the perspective of rent - seeking. This paper analyzes and studies the micro - innovation efficiency from the perspective of rent - seeking. The results show that the efficiency of technological innovation has not improved significantly in the rent - seeking enterprises. Further studies show that rent - seeking enterprises have significantly increased their perquisite consumption after obtaining technology subsidies , which may mean that enterprises have misappropriated or reduced the input funds for research and development. The policy implication of this article is that anti - corruption gov-ernance and technological innovation are not completely unrelated. Corruption control can improve the micro innovation efficiency of subsidy policy as well as purify the social political environment.

关 键 词：科技补贴 创新效率 企业寻租 腐败治理 

分 类 号：G322[文化科学]