简述伊斯兰哲学中的“本性共相”问题  

A Brief Exposition of “Natural Universals” in Islamic Philosophy

作　　者：王希[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院世界宗教研究所

出　　处：《世界哲学》2017年第6期80-89,共10页World Philosophy

摘　　要：阿维森纳提出的本性共相(即共有本性)是中世纪各大哲学传统探讨共相问题的共同出发点和中心议题。本性共相具有某种"中立"地位,既非一,又非多,既非普遍,又非特殊,既不存在于心外客观世界,也不存在于灵魂之中。正是这种特性引发了哲学史上关于其本体论地位的长久争论。本文旨在简单梳理伊斯兰哲学传统中本性共相问题的提出、发展和演变,以及各学术派别的处理方式及基本立场。'Natural universals'(common universals)proposed by Avicenna is the central concept and common starting-point when the major traditions of philosophy in the Medieval Era discussed the problem of universals.A natural universal in itself is in the position of the ontological neutrality so that it is neither one nor many,neither universal nor particular,neither in the extra-mental world,nor in the soul.It is this character that triggers the long and bitter disputes over its ontological position in the history of philosophy.This study aimed at exposing the emergence and evolution of the problem of natural universals,the different ways to deal with it,and the different positions on it in the tradition of Islamic philosophy.

关 键 词：本性共相 逻辑共相 理智共相 本质 诸视角 

分 类 号：B968[哲学宗教—宗教学]