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作 者:赵明[1]
机构地区:[1]安徽交通职业技术学院管理工程系,安徽合肥230051
出 处:《佛山科学技术学院学报(自然科学版)》2017年第5期41-48,共8页Journal of Foshan University(Natural Science Edition)
基 金:安徽省高校自然科学研究重点资助项目(KJ2016A161)
摘 要:针对由一个运输商为领导者、一个制造商和一个零售商为跟随者的供应链,分别建立了独立决策下由制造商承担运费和零售商承担运费的Stackelberg博弈模型,得到了供应链各方的最优解和最大总利润;然后构建了供应链集中决策模型,并求出系统最优解和最大总利润;通过比较发现,集中决策下的最优减排率和系统总利润在三种决策中都是最高的;进而利用不对称Nash协商模型,协调供应链各成员的利益;最后,利用数值例子验证了本模型。For the supply chain by a transporter as a leader, a manufacturer and a retailer as the followers, this paper firstly establishes the Stackelberg game models when the manufacturer and the retailer respectively bears the freight under the decentralized decision. We obtain the three members Optimal solutions and their maximum profits respectively. Secondly, we set up the supply chain centralized decision model and get the system optimal solutions and total profit. Through the comparison of the optimal solutions and total profits of three kinds of decision making, we find that the optimal reduction rate and total profit of the system are the highest under the centralized decision. Furthermore, we coordinate the supply chain members' profits by using the asymmetric Nash negotiation model. Finally, we provide a numerical example to test our model.
关 键 词:低碳运输 减排率 STACKELBERG博弈 不对称Nash协商模型
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