央行沟通的可信性与通货膨胀预期  

The Reliability of Central Bank Communication and Inflation Expectation

作　　者：王少林 林建浩[2] Wang Shaolin Lin Jianhao

机构地区：[1]广东财经大学金融学院 [2]中山大学岭南学院

出　　处：《统计研究》2017年第10期54-65,共12页Statistical Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目"新常态下通胀预期的形成机制与信息干预研究"(15CJL008)资助

摘　　要：通过信息沟通进行预期管理是当代央行重要的政策实践,而能否获得公众信任则是央行沟通实现政策目标的重要条件。本文在Morris和Shin(2002)的博弈模型基础上,引入公众对于央行公布信息的信任程度,从理论上论证了公众信任对于央行沟通发挥引导预期作用的重要影响。进一步,本文建立了具有时变参数的VAR模型(TVP-SV-VAR),实证研究发现:我国央行沟通信息一直保持着较高的准确性,这不断提高了公众对央行的信任,并使得央行沟通能够有效地引导公众的通货膨胀预期。央行沟通是当前我国通货膨胀管理的成功实践。提高央行信息沟通的可预见性,在央行沟通中增加定量预测和扩大央行沟通的范畴,是进一步提高央行声誉的有益尝试。It is an important policy practice for the central bank to realize the expectation management through information communication,and whether central bank communication accesses to public trust is an important condition for central bank communication to achieve the policy objectives. Based on the game model of Morris and Shin（ 2002）,this paper introduces the public＇s trust in the information published by the central bank,and theoretically demonstrates that public trust plays an important role in guiding expectations of central bank communication. Furthermore,this paper establishes a VAR model with time-varying parameters（ TVPSV-VAR）. The empirical results show that the information of central bank communication has maintained high accuracy,which continuously enhances public confidence in the central bank and enables central bank communication to effectively guide the public＇ s inflation expectations. The central bank communication has become the successful practice of China＇s current inflation management. Improving the predictability of central bank communication,adding the quantitative forecast in the central bank communication and expanding the scope of central bank communication,is a useful attempt to further improve the reputation of the central bank.

关 键 词：央行沟通 信任 通货膨胀预期 

分 类 号：C812[社会学—统计学]