海德格尔论科学实在的此在式结构  

Heidegger on the Structure of Dasein of Scientific Reality

作　　者：王颖斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]太原科技大学哲学研究所,山西太原030024

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2017年第6期124-130,共7页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目(项目编号:15BZX026)

摘　　要：实证科学将实在界定为客观存在的东西,提防并力图消除人化成分的干扰。海德格尔质疑和批判其合法性,反对科学在单纯知识论的结构中对实在的这一规限。他依照存在论生存论的结构制定方向,通过对实在之在世结构、寻视结构、意向结构的分析,展现实在和此在之间不可分离的源始关联,从而解构了实在的客观性。这对反思科学研究活动中非客观因素的作用,无疑具有重要的意义。Positive science define reality as objective beings, and take precautions against and try to eliminate the interference of humanization. Heidegger queried and criticized its legitimacy, meanwhile he opposed that science restricted reality like so in mere epistemologicl restructure. He orientated toward existential-ontological structure, then unfolded reality＇s inseparable original relevance to Dasein and deconstructed reality＇s objectivity by analysing reality＇s restructure of being-in-the-world, circumspection and intentionality. This has important significant in reflecting the action of non-objective factor in scientific research.

关 键 词：实在 此在 在世 寻视 意向 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]