董事会独立性之惑与董事分类选举制度的构建  

The Confusion of the Independence of the Board of Directors and the Establishment of the Election Systems of the Board of Directors

作　　者：孙光焰[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南民族大学法学院,武汉430074

出　　处：《北京社会科学》2017年第11期70-80,共11页Social Sciences of Beijing

摘　　要：从公司治理的角度来看,董事及董事会既是公司治理的主体,也是公司治理的客体,处于公司治理承上启下最为核心的地位。董事及董事会不可能具有独立性或中立性,这是由每位董事与生俱来的身份差异决定的。现行公司法一味强调董事和董事会的独立性,而相应的董事选举制度设计并不支持董事的独立性要求,致使董事角色错位,严重影响了公司治理的效率。应明确承认不同类型的董事由不同的利益相关者提名选任,并由提名人对被提名人的职务侵权行为承担相应的责任。From the perspective of corporate governance,the directors and the board of directors are both the main body of corporate governance and the object of corporate governance,which is at the core of corporate governance. Directors and board of directors cannot be independent or neutral,which is inherent in the different identities of each director. The current Company Law blindly and unrealistically emphasizes the independence of the directors and the board of directors,and the corresponding design of the director election systems does not support the independence of the board of the director,leading to the dislocation of director roles,and seriously affects the efficiency of corporate governance. It is important to recognize that the different types of directors are nominated by different stakeholders and that the nominee should take the corresponding responsibility for the alleged infringement of the nominee’s duties.

关 键 词：公司治理 分类董事 董事提名权 董事选举 

分 类 号：DF41[政治法律—经济法学]