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机构地区:[1]华南农业大学经济管理学院,广东广州510642
出 处:《华南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年第6期72-83,共12页Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
基 金:国家社会科学基金青年项目(13CJY087)
摘 要:梳理国内外养殖户层面动物疫病防控激励研究进展,现有文献从经济和非经济因素分析养殖户防控激励。其中,经济因素包括内部和外部经济激励,内部经济激励来自防控措施对疫病损失的规避效果;养殖户疫病防控的外部性产生了公共政策干预和养殖户之间策略互动两类外部经济激励。非经济激励包含对疫病、风险和补偿的认知和态度,以及文化、声誉和责任感等因素。当前我国疫病防控政策对养殖户的经济激励重视不足、外部和内部经济激励错配,加之没有考虑非经济激励的营造与构建,是造成养殖户防控要素投入不足、疫情隐瞒等公共政策激励不相容的原因。针对动物疫病防控政策的缺陷,从经济与非经济激励两方面提出了矫正建议。Through literature review,this paper summarizes the latest research fruits on farmers’incentives on prevention and control animal diseases. It shows that farmers’prevention and control decisionmaking is affected by economic and noneconomic factors. The economic factors consist of internal andexternal incentives. Internal economic incentives are from the effects of prevention and control measures.External prevention and control behavior generates two kinds of external economic incentives,namely,public policy intervention and strategic interaction among farmers. While noneconomic incentives include farmers’perceptions and attitudes towards animal diseases,risk and compensation,as well as cultural,reputation,responsibility,and so on. The reasons that cause incentive incompatibility betweenpublic policy such as shortages of prevention behavior input and epidemic situation concealed are insufficient attention on economic incentives of disease prevention and control policy,mismatch between external and internal economic incentives,and no consideration for construction of noneconomic incentives. Itgives some suggestions for correcting epidemic prevention policies in China from both economic and noneconomic perspectives.
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