创新驱动模式下战略性新兴产业政府补贴策略分析  

Analysis of Subsidy Strategies against Strategic Emerging Industries Characterized by Innovation Driving Mode

作　　者：秦字兴[1] QIN Zi-xing(Mechanical ＆ Engineering School, Beijing Information Science ＆ Technology University, Beijing 100192, China)

机构地区：[1]北京信息科技大学机电工程学院,北京100192

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2017年第10期173-180,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上资助项目"基于Multi-Agent的应急状态下协同供应链数据集成研究"(61272513)

摘　　要：针对政府补贴难以激励战略性新兴产业形成创新驱动力的问题,以新能源汽车产业为例,构建了一个旨在促进企业技术研发的政府创新补贴策略分析模型。假设产业呈现明显的创新驱动特征,模型分别针对政府理性决策与有限理性决策的情况,对政府创新补贴及企业创新投入策略进行了博弈均衡分析,并讨论了技术创新环境的改善对最优策略及局中人收益的影响。结果表明,在创新驱动模式下,企业最优创新投入比例对政府补贴水平不敏感,且过高的补贴可能挤出企业创新投入,容易形成企业套利空间。此外,改善技术创新环境对强化企业市场主体地位,弱化政府管制对市场的干预具有积极作用。With green car industry for example, a dynamic game model between government and enterprises is built to adjust subsidy strategies, promote R＆D investment and it tries to deal with the problem： innovation sub- sidies can hardly help strategic emerging industries enhance innovation-driven force. Assume that green car industry is characterized by innovation-driven, subsidy strategies and innovation investment strategies under gov- ernment rational decision and bounded rational decision are analyzed, and the impact on equilibrium strategies by improved innovation environment is discussed. The results indicate that with the industry innovation driven, enterprises＇ optimum innovation investment ratio is not sensitive to subsidies. Excessive subsidies may crowd out enterprises＇ innovation investment, and tend to raise the possibility of enterprise arbitrage. Besides, improved innovation environment contributes to enterprises＇ market principal position, and could weaken market interven- tion caused by government regulations.

关 键 词：管理科学与工程 创新补贴 动态博弈 创新驱动 新能源汽车产业 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]