立法中的地方利益本位问题及应对之策  

The Causes and Countermeasures of Local Interests Tendency in Legislation

作　　者：黄兰松[1,2] 汪全胜 HUANG Lan - song;WANG Quan - sheng

机构地区：[1]山东大学(威海)法学院 [2]山东大学(威海)政府法制研究中心,立法研究服务基地,立法研究中心

出　　处：《北方法学》2017年第6期120-129,共10页Northern Legal Science

基　　金：2017年国家社科基金一般项目“地方立法的精细化研究”(17BFX162)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：立法中的地方利益本位本质上是公共权力的价值选择和利益偏好的合法化,其集中表现为行政部门利益的法制化和保护主义的法制化。作为具有"独特的利益偏好"的政府部门主导地方立法的结果,它带来了立法权力异化的风险,包括增加地方政府间竞争的"交易成本"、违背法治的权力约束和平等的尊重原则、巩固地方权威主义的治理模式并加剧其合法化危机。对此,可行的对策是提升地方人大的民主立法能力、建立立法回避制度、落实违法违宪审查机制。The local interests tendency in legislation is to make the value choice of public power andlegal interests preference legalized. Its concentrated expressions are the legalization of administrative departmentinterests and administrative region interests. As the government department has unique interest preference, the government - led local legislation is easy to have the risk of alienation in local legislation, such asincreasing local govemments, competitive transaction costs, ignoring the monocracy value like power restrictionand equal respect. It has consolidated the authoritarian governance mode, and exacerbates the legitimacycrisis in local legislation. In this regard, the appropriate measures are to make correction on it, such aspromoting the democratic legislative competence of local peopled congresses, setting up a legislative avoidancesystem, carrying out the implementation of the constitutional review mechanism in illegal violation.

关 键 词：立法 地方利益 部门利益 地区利益 

分 类 号：DF0[政治法律—法学理论]