耐用品垄断市场中的租赁与销售契约  

Leasing and Selling in Durable-Goods Monopoly

作　　者：尹训东 许敏波 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学中国公共财政与政策研究院 [2]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2017年第11期85-96,共12页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：中央财经大学青年科研创新团队项目"政府监管体制的最优组织结构选择"和"中国低生育率的微观决策和宏观政策研究"(项目批准号:020550317009);国家自然科学基金面上项目"人口政策;社会网络与个体创业;储蓄和投资行为分析"(项目批准号:71673314)

摘　　要：本文研究一个两期的耐用品模型,首先考虑消费者的类型是固定的情形,然后扩展到消费者类型随时间而变化的情况。我们考虑了有完全承诺力、有限承诺力和没有承诺力下的情况,同时考虑了在租赁契约中的消费者是匿名和非匿名的情形。当消费者的类型不变时,租赁是否优于销售取决于消费者是否匿名的假设。如果是匿名的,则租赁优于销售。如果是非匿名的,则在两期模型中租赁等价于销售。当消费者的类型是随时间变化并且服从马尔科夫过程,并且厂商有完全承诺力,那么销售会优于租赁。如果没有承诺力并且消费者是匿名的,我们证明了当在两种状态间的转移概率很高时,销售会优于租赁。如果状态间的转移概率是低的,租赁会优于销售。当我们放弃马尔科夫过程而假设低类型消费者在两个时期的价值是独立时,在没有承诺力的情况下,租赁和销售无法简单地比较优劣。This paper analyzes a two-period durable-goods model that allows both consumers＇ valuations to be fixed and to vary over time. First,we review the characterization of optimal contract when consumer＇s types are constant. Then we extend to cases where consumer＇s types are stochastic. We consider situations under full commitment、limited commitment and no commitment assumptions. We consider both anonymous buyers and non-anonymous buyers under leasing contract. When buyer＇s valuation is constant,whether leasing dominates selling depends on the assumption of buyers are anonymous or not. If buyers are anonymous,leasing dominates selling. If buyers are non-anonymous,leasing is equivalent to selling in two-period case. When buyer＇s valuation is varying over time and we assume buyer＇s valuation follows Markovian process,under full commitment selling dominates leasing. Without commitment and consumers are anonymous,we show that selling dominates leasing when the probability of transition between states is high. If the transition between states is low,leasing dominates selling. When we abandon the Markovian assumption and assume the low type＇s valuation is independent in the two periods,under no commitment,neither leasing dominates selling nor selling dominates leasing.

关 键 词：完全承诺力 长期契约 重新谈判 销售契约 租赁契约 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] F08