延迟退休年龄下政策和行为的博弈、影响及选择  

The Dynamic Game between Policy and Behavior Choice under Delay Retirement

作　　者：王俊春 彭杰武 赵斌[2] 袁媛[3] 董晓波[3] 

机构地区：[1]保山学院经济管理学院,云南保山678000 [2]人力资源和社会保障部社会保障研究所,北京100029 [3]云南省农业科学院农业经济与信息研究所,云南昆明650200

出　　处：《保山学院学报》2017年第5期80-92,共13页JOURNAL OF BAOSHAN UNIVERSITY

摘　　要：对延长退休年龄问题存在的几个误解进行澄清,而后引入与其密切联系且不容忽视的提前退休现象,指出延长退休年龄下会涉及政策和相关利益方行为的博弈,于是通过实物经济建模和借用生命周期假说对其影响与选择进行综合分析,认为延迟退休年龄是解决养老制度诸多问题的渠道之一,但政策制定和改革思路的关键在于需要渐进式延长退休年龄并建立与之相适应的多项配套措施。Retirement is a major event in life. With the overall increase in life expectancy, the government determined to extend the retirement age policy implemented this year. Delayed retirement age will have a great influence on pension insurance fund balance, labor supply,economic burden and the interests of intergenerational, In this paper, at the first, focus on several misconceptions of retirement age increase, then introduce the phenomenon of early retirement. Analysis on dynamic game under the policy of raising the retirement age through economic modeling and the life cycle hypothesis, the result is that it＇s one way to solve many problems of the pension system channels, but the key is that establish the supporting measures for policy development and reform the policy of raise the retirement age.

关 键 词：退休年龄 延迟退休 实物经济 生命周期假说 博弈选择 

分 类 号：F241.34[经济管理—劳动经济]