中央与地方财政划分的宪法治理难题  

Constitutional Governance Problems of Fiscal Distribution between Central and Local Government

作　　者：涂云新[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学法学院 [2]复旦大学人权研究中心(国家人权教育与培训基地)

出　　处：《法学评论》2017年第6期28-43,共16页Law Review

基　　金：2014年度教育部国家人权教育与培训基地项目"人权建设与现代国家治理--中国的实践与探索"(项目批准号:14JJD820021)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：从财政的法律观点来看,作为"财政国家"的核心体系之一的财政划分制度是国家"财政治理"中最为敏感和最为复杂的理论和实践问题。其核心的治理问题是中央与地方在财政事权和支出责任划分中的模式选择与制度建构。以中央为本位的财税体制与以地方为本位的财税体制都面临着政府间财政关系在交叉重合领域内的划分难题。基于财政划分在宪法上的"功能—结构"设计和中国分税制改革的实践经验,我国应该在适度加强中央的财政事权的基础上渐进性地保障地方的财政自主和财源充足,这样将有利于推动中央和地方财政划分法治化的进程,从而使得现行财税体制符合"财政宪法"所昭示的价值追求。From the perspective of fiscal law,as the core of a fiscal state,the vertical distribution of fiscal power between the central and local governments is one of the most complicated and controversial issues surrounding‘fiscal governance＇.The dominating issue here is how to construct an institution which can draw a relatively clear line between the central and local governments concerning both their fiscal power and the corresponding spending responsibilities.It is contended that both the unitary system and the federal system would be confronted with this significant problems.Based on a constitutional rule of law and the current revenue-sharing system in China,this article have adopted a functional-structural approach to address the issue.It is suggested that China should gradually strengthen local governmental fiscal power in the context of a centralized system.It would be of great importance to push China＇s fiscal rule of law and finally be a country governed by fiscal constitutionalism.

关 键 词：财政划分 财政事权 支出责任 财政分权理论 财政宪法 

分 类 号：D921[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]