股东滥用权利的司法规制——法院适用《公司法》第20条的实证分析  

Judicial Regulation of Shareholders' Rights Abuse——An Empirical Analysis of Article 20 of the Company Law

作　　者：贺茜[1,2] HE Xi(Law School, Shandong University, Qingdao 266237, P. R. Chin)

机构地区：[1]山东大学法学院 [2]美国加州大学伯克利分校法学院

出　　处：《山东大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2017年第6期43-51,共9页Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"有限责任公司内部治理研究--以股东利益冲突解决机制为中心"(13YJA820007)

摘　　要：公司治理的一个重要目标是保障多数股东获得控制利益的同时遏制其侵害少数股东利益的可能性,如何平衡二者之间的关系给中国司法实践带来了巨大的挑战。对近年来法院适用《公司法》第20条之案件的实证分析显示,股东滥用权利集中表现在股东利益冲突交易、不当管理、盈余分配和排挤管理等几方面。研究表明,虽然《公司法》第20条在司法实践中对保护有限责任公司中受损股东利益已经产生了有利的影响,但是不同法院适用的标准尺度并不相同。司法实践中应当坚持多元化的审查标准,强化审查公司决策的合理性,对公司中的少数股东提供适当的救济。One important goal of corporate governance is to safeguard the majority of shareholders＇ to controlling the interests and to restrict the possibility of infringing the minority shareholders＇ interests at the same time.It has brought great challenges to China＇s judicial practice that how to balance the relationship between those two parties.An empirical analysis of the application of the Article 20 of Company Law shows that the shareholders＇ rights abuse are concentrated in the interest-conflicting transactions,improper management,distribution and squeeze-out management.Through this research,we find that though it has generated positive influence in safeguarding the impaired shareholders＇ benefit,different courts applied the article in different scales.Judicial practice should adhere to a wide variety of review standards,flexible application of the Article 20 of Company Law,strengthening the rationality of corporation decision and offer proper remedies to the minority shareholders.

关 键 词：忠实义务 善管义务 滥用股东权利 《公司法》第20条 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]