重复博弈、社区能力与农田水利合作  

Repeated Games, Community Capacity and Rural Water Conservancy Cooperation

作　　者：吴秋菊 林辉煌 Wu Qiuju;Lin Huihuang

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学公共管理学院 [2]华南理工大学公共政策研究院

出　　处：《中国农村观察》2017年第6期86-99,共14页China Rural Survey

基　　金：华南理工大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目"生态安全视阈下的集体林权制度改革研究"(项目编号:XBS05);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"我国社会治理体系构建及其运行机制研究"(项目编号:16JZD026);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目"农业水权制度的法律实践及改革研究"(项目编号:13YJC820023)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：重复博弈理论认为,如果存在无限次的重复博弈,人们最终会形成自发的合作秩序。然而中国农田水利运行的实践表明,即使农户之间存在长期的用水博弈,自发的合作也不一定能达成。原因在于:由整合能力、参与能力与执行能力构成的农村社区能力的弱化,使得水利博弈合作因为上下游不对称而产生的参与成本、因为用水协商而产生的整合成本以及因为惩罚搭便车行为而产生的执行成本无法得到有效的化解。而导致社区能力弱化的原因,主要是农村社会的原子化以及农村基层组织的虚化。通过对农村社区能力的重建,农田水利的合作有可能在重复博弈的过程中最终实现。Repeated game theory holds that if there are infinite repeated games, people eventually tend to establish spontaneous cooperation. However, the practice of rural water conservancy in China shows that in spite of long-term games in water conservancy among farmers, spontaneous cooperation is not necessarily achieved. The reason is that rural community abilities of integration, participation and implementation are weakened. Therefore, the cost of water conservancy games, including participation cost out of asymmetric positions held by upstream and downstream farmers, integration cost in the negotiation process and implementation cost in the process of punishing free riders, cannot be effectively resolved. The main reason for the weakening of rural community abilities is the atomization of rural society and the vitmalizafion of rural grassroots organizations. Through the recomlruction of rural community abilities, the cooperation in rural water conservancy may be realized in the process of repeated games.

关 键 词：重复博弈 社区能力 水利合作 

分 类 号：C912.82[经济管理]