政府补贴、过度投资与产能过剩--基于国有、非国有工业上市公司的实证研究  

Government Subsidy,Over-investment and Overcapacity——An Empirical Research Based on the Date of State-owned and Non-state-owned Listed Industrial Companies

作　　者：李博[1,2] 赵树宽 余海晴[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学管理学院,吉林长春130012 [2]长春师范大学经济管理学院,吉林长春130032

出　　处：《预测》2017年第6期50-55,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71641029);国家自然科学基金青年资助项目(71402063);教育部人文社会科学研究基金青年资助项目(14YJC630177)

摘　　要：本文以189家工业上市公司2008~2015年数据为样本,研究了政府补贴、过度投资与产能过剩之间的关系,以及企业性质的调节机制。研究结果表明:政府补贴与产能过剩呈正相关关系,过度投资与产能过剩呈正相关关系,并进一步证实了政府补贴和过度投资的交互与产能过剩的正相关关系。相对于非国有企业,国有企业更容易获得政府补贴,过度投资倾向更明显;且国有企业政府补贴与产能过剩,过度投资与产能过剩的正相关关系更强。Using the data of 189 listed industrial companies from 2008 to 2015,this paper analyzes the relationship between government subsidy,over-investment and overcapacity,and discusses the regulation effect of enterprise nature.The results show that: government subsidy has positive effect on overcapacity,over-investment has positive effect on overcapacity,and are further confirmed that government subsidy and over-investment interaction has positive effect on overcapacity. Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises are more likely to obtain government subsidy and tendency for over-investment. Furthermore,there shows a stronger positive relationship between government subsidy and overcapacity,as well as over-investment and overcapacity in state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：政府补贴 过度投资 产能过剩 工业企业 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济]