银行贷款治理控股股东侵占案例分析——以委内瑞拉M公司项目融资为例  

A Case Analysis of Bank Loan to Solve Controlling Shareholder's Embezzlement Issue—Based on Project Financing of Venezuelan Company M

作　　者：刘林[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学(北京),北京102249

出　　处：《改革与战略》2017年第11期174-179,共6页Reformation & Strategy

摘　　要：M公司是中委两国的国家石油公司在委内瑞拉组建的合资公司。按照委方法律规定,中方作为外方合作伙伴最多占股40%。文章以M公司项目融资为例,分析在尊重资源国相关法律规定的前提下,能否站在贷款银行和弱势小股东的角度,即使不改变股权结构,也可以通过公司项目化融资管理模式创新,获得银行贷款。案例分析结果表明:虽然现行管理模式无法获得银行贷款,但在不改变M公司股权结构的情况下,强势大股东与弱势小股东之间完全有可能通过对现行管理权限重新进行项目化融资管理模式设计,确保贷款银行安全有效地收回贷款本金和利息,实现银企之间与公司内部大小股东之间的合作双赢。Company M in Venezuela is a joint venture of national oil companies from Venezuela and China. By Venezuelan laws, China can only hold up to 40% shares as a foreign partner. The paper, from the perspective of banks and minority shareholders, uses company M as a case to discuss about getting loans legally with project financing management innovation, but without changing the ownership structure. The results show, even though the current management model can＇t help company get loans, with the redesign and reallocation of controlling and minority shareholders＇ administrative rights, it＇s definitely possible for banks to recover principal and interests safely and efficiently, again, without changing the equity structure. In the case, double wins between banks and corporations, controlling and minority shareholders can be realized.

关 键 词：项目融资 银行贷款 公司治理 管理模式 委内瑞拉 

分 类 号：F831.7[经济管理—金融学]