管理者过度自信行为下煤矿安全监管机制设计研究  

Mechanism Design for Coalmine Safety Management with Overconfident Manager

作　　者：陈克贵[1] 王新宇[1] 宋学锋[2] 张明慧[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116 [2]南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,江苏南京210046

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2017年第11期182-189,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家重点研发计划项目(2017YFC0804408);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173216);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(17YJC630012);江苏省社会科学基金项目研究成果(15JD038);中国博士后科研基金资助项目(2015M570492)

摘　　要：针对我国煤矿安全监管的现状以及管理者的过度自信行为,建立了包括政府、煤矿企业以及过度自信的煤矿管理者的两阶段多任务委托代理模型,并从理论上分析了过度自信行为对煤矿管理者自身的安全管理投入、煤矿企业的激励参数、政府奖惩力度以及政府安全绩效的影响,并与煤矿管理者完全理性的情况对比。研究表明,煤矿管理者的安全管理投入、政府奖惩力度以及政府的安全绩效在过度自信程度增大时都会越来越偏离煤矿管理者完全理性时的情形,最后给出算例并验证了相关结论,为我国煤矿安全监管和实践提供了决策支持。For the status of China＇ s coalmine safety supervision and the coalmine manager＇ s overconfidence behavior, the two-stage muhitask principal-agent model consisting of government, coalmine enterprise and overcon- fident manager is constructed, and the impact of the manager＇ s overconfidence level on its own safety supervision effort, the coalmine enterprise＇ s incentive coefficient, the government＇s rewards and punishment coefficient and the government- safety performance is analyzed. The results are further compared to the completely rational scenar- io. It is found that, as the manager＇ s overconfidence level increases, the manager＇ s safety supervision effort level, the rewards and punishment coefficient, and the corresponding safety work performance deviate far away from the rational scenario. Finally a numerical example is provided to demonstrate the validity of the proposed model and results, which finds an appropriate decision support for the coalmine safety supervision and practice.

关 键 词：煤矿企业 安全监管 机制设计 过度自信 双重委托代理理论 

分 类 号：F203[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32