放松卖空管制与企业环境信息披露质量——基于重污染企业的准自然实验  

Lifting of Short Sale Constraint and the Quality of Environmental Information Disclosure: A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on Heavily Polluting Enterprises

作　　者：郑建明[1] 许晨曦[1] 张伟[2] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029 [2]新疆财经大学会计学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830012

出　　处：《中国软科学》2017年第11期111-125,共15页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71662209);国家自然科学基金项目(71662209;71602004);教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"(NCET-11-0623);对外经济贸易大学研究生科研创新基金资助(2017076)

摘　　要：环境问题已受到各界的普遍关注,环境信息披露成为企业接受社会监督、承担社会责任的重要纽带。本文采用2009-2015年的中国重污染行业上市公司为样本,借助于中国资本市场2010年放松卖空管制这一"准自然实验",实证检验了放松卖空管制对企业环境信息披露质量的影响机制。研究发现,放松卖空管制提高了企业环境信息披露质量,这一影响主要体现在第一大股东持股比例较高的企业中,并且在环境规制相对较弱的地区,这种影响更为显著。本文的研究结论表明:市场监督机制不仅能够有效促进公司治理的发挥,还可以与政府治理机制形成替代作用,为我国建立市场化机制,推进环境保护市场化提供了经验证据。The environment problem has received widespread attention from all walks of life,and environmental information disclosure has become an important link between social supervision and social responsibility. Based on A-share China＇s heavily polluting listed firms on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2009 to 2015,this study examines the effect of lifting of short sale constraints on environmental information disclosure,taking lifting of short sale constraint as a quasi-natural experiment. The empirical results indicate that lifting short sale constraint can help to improve the quality of corporate environmental information disclosure,which is mainly reflected in firms with relatively concentrated ownership by controlling shareholders,and in areas under weaker environmental regulation. Generally speaking,market supervision mechanism can not only effectively promote the corporate governance,but also form a alternative role with government governance mechanism,which provides empirical evidence for China to establish market mechanism and promote the marketization of environmental protection.

关 键 词：环境信息披露 卖空 市场监督 政府治理 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学]