人口老龄化背景下中国式养老问题研究:基于博弈论视角  

A Study of Chinese Pension Problem in the Context of Population Aging from Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：施阳[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东青年政治学院,济南250103

出　　处：《山东青年政治学院学报》2017年第6期30-34,共5页Journal of Shandong Youth University of Political Science

基　　金：山东青年政治学院经济管理学院科研培育基金"人口与产业"学术团队建设项目

摘　　要：目前,随着我国人口老龄化程度不断加深,养老保障体系面临巨大考验。实际在养老问题上,政府、父母、子女三方之间存在博弈,其中一方会根据其他各方的策略调整自身策略,以求利益最大化。根据相关博弈理论,建立关于政府、父母、子女三方的养老博弈利益矩阵,分析造成博弈不均衡的原因,进而从完善社保体系、创新养老模式、开拓养老产业新思路、转变思想观念、发展信息化养老等方面提出促进博弈均衡出现的对策和建议。At present, with the deepening of the aging population in China, China^s old-age security system is facing a huge test. In fact, on the issue of pension, the government, parents, children are in the game, they will adjust their own strategies to maximize their own interests based on other strategies. The author tries to establish the receipts matrix of Chinese pension which is based on the game theory, after that, the author analyzes the reasons of the game imbalance, at last , the author proposes five proposals to resolve the problems： improving the social secu-rity system, innovating the old-age model, opening up new ideas of the old-age industry, changing the percep-tions, developing the information-based pension.

关 键 词：人口老龄化 中国式养老博弈 利益矩阵 均衡 

分 类 号：C92-05[社会学—人口学]