高管激励对研发投入影响研究——终极控制权的调节作用  

Influential Research of Executive Incentive on R&D Investment——The Moderating of Ultimate Control Rights

作　　者：苗淑娟[1] 夏朦 孟庆顺[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学管理学院,长春130022

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2018年第1期41-48,共8页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

摘　　要：本文以医药制造类上市公司2013~2015年数据为样本,实证研究了高管激励与研发投入之间关系以及不同终极控制权性质下高管激励对研发投入的影响。结果表明:高管持股、高管薪酬与研发投入之间均呈现"倒U形"非线性关系,即随着高管持股比例与高管薪酬水平的增大,研发投入先增加后减少,高管激励只在一定合理范围内对企业研发投入产生较强的促进作用,过高或过低的激励力度均不能有效提升企业的研发投入;与非国有控制企业相比,国有控制企业的高管持股对研发投入的影响更大、而高管薪酬对研发投入的影响不明显。Based on the data of the pharmaceutical manufacturing listed enterprises during 2013 to 2015, this paper studiedthe relationship between executive incentive and R＆D investment and how the ultimate control rights of corporation influenced the re？lationship between them. The results showed that there was an inverted U-shaped relationship between senior executives？ holdingsand R＆D investment as well as executive compensation, which means that R＆D investment increased first and then decreased withthe increasing of executive share ratio and executive compensation. Executive incentives only play a strong role in promoting R＆Dinvestment within a reasonable range. Compared with non - state - controlled enterprises, state - controlled enterprises executives？holdings had a greater impact on R＆D investment, and state-controlled executive compensation had not obvious impact on R＆D in？vestment.

关 键 词：高管激励 研发投入 终极控制权 医药制造行业 回归分析 倒U型 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]