晋升博弈、竞争冲动与区域性产能过剩  

The Promotion Game,Competition Impulse and Regional Excess Capacity

作　　者：白雪洁[1] 于志强 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济与社会发展研究院 [2]南开大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2018年第1期78-92,共15页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目“以供给侧结构性改革化解我国新兴产业产能过剩的路径研究”(16YJA790002);中国特色社会主义经济建设协同创新中心资助项目

摘　　要：在中国式的晋升体制背景下,地方政府官员以GDP来博取政治晋升的资本是不可回避的一个现实。为了获得优异的经济增长绩效,地方政府对产业发展的直接影响甚至不当激励是导致产能过剩,特别是区域性产能过剩的主要原因之一。通过利用2003—2014年中国省级面板数据分别测算了东部和中西部地区各省市的制造业行业产能利用情况,检验了东部和中西部地区产能过剩成因的区域性差异,结果发现:土地支持、金融支持、环境纵容、市场化程度和地方政府投资对东部和中西部地区产能过剩的作用方向基本一致,但在作用程度上明显具有区域色彩。最后从体制性"局限"、政府干预和市场运行三个维度提出化解中国制造业产能过剩的政策启示。Under the background of Chinese promotion system,local government officials relying on GDP to gain the capital of political promotion is a unavoidable reality. In order to obtain excellent economic growth performance,the direct influence of local government on the industry development and perverse incentives lead to excess capacity,especially as one of the main reasons for regional excess capacity. By using the provincial panel data of China from 2003 to 2014,this paper respectively measures the manufacturing industry capacity utilization of various provinces and cities in the East and Midwest,and examines the regional differences of excess capacity causes of the East and Midwest,the findings are as follows: land support,financial support,environmental indulgence,marketization degree and the local government investment almost have the same effect on the excess capacity of the East and Midwest,but the effect degree has obvious regional characters. Besides,this paper puts forward three policy suggests,namely the systematic "limitation",government intervention and market operation,to resolve Chinese manufacturing industry excess capacity.

关 键 词：晋升体制 产能过剩 产能利用率 成本函数法 

分 类 号：F014.9[经济管理—政治经济学]