国资改革与混合所有制——基于委托代理理论视角  

State-owned Assets Reform and Mixed Ownership: Based on the Perspective of Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：李炳堃 

机构地区：[1]北京大学经济学院,北京100871

出　　处：《经济问题》2017年第12期60-64,共5页On Economic Problems

摘　　要：党的十八届三中全会确定了国资改革重心由"管资产为主"转变为"管资本为主",并进一步明确了混合所有制改革为国企改革的"重要突破口"。基于新制度经济学的委托代理理论,阐述了混合所有制改革有助于解决国有资本没有可以追溯的"最终委托人"的核心问题,澄清了"国有资本投资运营公司"有助于降低代理成本,并提出应进一步完善市场经济法制建设,做实混合所有制企业的董事会,发挥好市场经济的监督作用。The Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China（ CPC） decided that the focus of state-owned assets reform was changed from ＂asset-based management＂to＂capital-based management＂,and also pointed out that mixed-ownership reform is an＂essential breakthrough＂of state-owned enterprise reform. This paper,based on the principal-agent theory of the New Institutional Economics,explains that the mixed ownership reform can help solve the core problem of the State-owned capital that its ＂ultimate principal＂cannot be identified,clarifies that the ＂State-owned capital investment and operation company＂will decrease the agency cost. Finally,the paper put forward that we Should make further improvement on legal system of the market economy construction,and build a functional board of directors of mixed-ownership enterprise,and utilize the supervision role of market economy.

关 键 词：国有资产改革 混合所有制 委托代理 

分 类 号：F121.2[经济管理—世界经济]