群体活动中“榜样的力量”是无穷的吗——来自一项动态公共品博弈实验的证据  

Is the Power of Example Infinite in Group Actions——Evidence from a Dynamic Public Goods Experiment

作　　者：张元鹏[1] 张皓辰 

机构地区：[1]北京大学经济学院

出　　处：《财贸经济》2017年第12期80-94,共15页Finance & Trade Economics

摘　　要：群体活动中我们会重视榜样人物的示范带头作用。本文在经典的公共品自愿捐献实验中加入了榜样先行机制,构造一个动态公共品博弈的实验模型,研究先行者的"榜样"行为对公共品捐献绩效的影响问题。与多数研究成果类似,本文的研究表明,有先行者的榜样作用相比于无先行者的情况,对公共品捐献有显著促进作用;且在先行者选择上,轮流担任和投票选举先行者带来的捐献效果要明显优于随机产生先行者的情况。但我们的研究还表明,个体社会偏好的异质性也对公共品捐献绩效影响显著:条件合作者和驼峰型偏好者的捐献绩效优于搭便车者,但民主选举产生先行者的方式有助于纠正搭便车者的投机倾向。In the study of group actions, we attach importance to the exemplary role of the model leader. In this paper, we add leading mechanism to the classic public goods experiment framework, focusing on the impact of the exemplary role of the leader on the performance of public goods contribution. Similar to most research results, our study shows that： compared to the case without leadership, the existing of leaders significantly improved the public goods contribution performance; and as for the mechanisms to select a leader, taking turns and election produce significantly more public goods contribution than randomly generating the leader. Moreover, our study also shows that the heterogeneity of personal social preference has a significant influence on public goods contribution results. Conditional cooperators and subjects with ＂hump-shaped＂ preference contribute more than free riders, while the democratic election mechanism to determine the leader helps to weaken the free riders＇ speculation.

关 键 词：社会偏好 领导机制 公共品自愿捐献 实验经济学 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]