契约执行效率与地区工业投资差异——基于行业样本的实证研究  

Contract Enforcement Efficiency and Difference of Regional Industrial Investment:An Empirical Study Based on Industry Samples

作　　者：吕朝凤[1] 支宏娟[1] LV Chao-feng;ZHI Hong-juan(Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学经济学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《当代财经》2017年第12期13-23,共11页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目"基于不完全契约的金融市场化改革对经济增长的影响效应及机制研究"(17BJL035);中国国家留学基金青年骨干教师出国研修项目(201606985008)

摘　　要：长期以来中国工业投资的地区分布极其不平衡,然而鲜有文献从不完全契约视角研究这一问题。在构建引入不完全契约的投资决策模型的基础上,利用中国30个省份26个工业行业的数据进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,契约执行效率是中国地区工业投资的一个决定因素,其对地区工业投资的正影响随着行业契约密集度的增大而提高。选择合理的工具变量克服契约执行效率的内生性问题,采用两阶段工具变量法进行回归,结果表明契约执行效率对地区工业投资的影响仍然显著为正。在一系列的稳健性检验中,上述结论均非常稳健。For a long time, the regional distribution of China＇s industrial investment has been extremely uneven. However, few literatures have studied this issue from the perspective of incomplete contracts. On the basis of constructing an investment decision model by introducing the concept of incomplete contract, this paper con ducts an empirical study with the data of 26 industries in China＇s30 provinces. The findings show that efficiency in contract enforcement is a decisive factor of industrial investment in China, its positive impact on the regional industrial investment will be increased with the growth of the industrial contract intensity. This paper chooses the reasonable instrumental variables to overcome the endogenous problems of contract enforcement efficiency. It adopts the two-stage instrumental variable method to carry out the regression; the results show that the impact of contract enforcement efficiency on the regional industrial investment is still significantly positive. In a series of robustness tests, it can be seen that the above conclusions are very robust.

关 键 词：工业投资 不完全契约 契约执行效率 

分 类 号：F403.5[经济管理—产业经济]