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机构地区:[1]山东管理学院新兴业态发展研究所,济南250357 [2]东南大学经济管理学院,南京211189
出 处:《统计与决策》2017年第24期142-146,共5页Statistics & Decision
基 金:国家社会科学基金资助项目(17CGL062)
摘 要:分部经理的行为是否规范在很大程度上决定了内部资本市场(ICM)的资金配置效率。已有文献研究假设都是总部对分部投资采取一次性策略,然而现实中总部通常选取分阶段投资策略,尤其在风险资本市场的研究中广泛的分析了投资决策者采用分阶段投资的情形。文章将释放一次性投资假设,在分阶段投资策略情形下,剖析分部经理机会行为及内部资金配置效率的关系。并通过建立"成本-收益权衡模型",说明"信息阶段性递增"效应与"资金匹配融损"效应交叉影响分阶段投资策略下的ICM资金配置效率。The opportunistic behavior of the division manager determines the allocation efficiency of an internal capital mar- ket (ICM) to a large extent. The existing literature research hypothesis is that headquarters uses one-shot tactics for division in- vestment, while in practice headquarters usually takes staged-investment strategy, especially in the research of the venture capital market. This paper gives an assumption of a one-shot investment, and under the condition of staged-investment strategy analyzes the relationship between the division manager' s opportunistic behavior and the internal capital allocation efficiency. And then by constructing a cost-benefit tradeoff model, the paper illustrates the ICM capital allocation efficiency under the cross influence of "information stepwise increase" effect and "capital matching and financial loss" effect on the staged-investment strategy.
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