从“宝万控制权之争”看中国上市公司反收购策略  

Analysis of the Anti-acquisition Strategy of Chinese Listed Companies from the Controversy over the Control of Bao Wan

作　　者：王艳林 刘梦然 塞寒 

机构地区：[1]内蒙古财经大学会计学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010070

出　　处：《内蒙古财经大学学报》2018年第1期60-65,共6页Journal of Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：内蒙古财经大学财务与会计研究中心资助

摘　　要：面对资本市场上频频发生的敌意收购,卓有成效的反收购策略是上市公司构筑反收购防线的根基所在。本文运用案例研究法,剖析了"宝万控制权之争"中万科主要采取的反收购策略及其失效的原因。研究发现:中国资本市场对稀缺绩优"壳资源"的需求和反收购相关法律制度的缺失是万科反收购策略失效的外部原因,万科过分分散的股权结构和管理层权力巨大等不完善内部治理机制是万科反收购策略失效的内部原因。根据上述研究结论,提出加强政府监管力度、健全反收购法律制度、建立双层股权结构和健全公司治理机制等政策建议。The effective anti - acquisition strategy is the foundation to the listed companies in frequent hostileacquisition in the capital market. In this paper, we use case study method to analyze the anti - acquisition strategyand the failure reasons in Vanke＇ s Control struggle. We found that demanding to the scarce and excellent ＂ shell resources＂ in China＇ s capital market and missing of anti - acquisition legal system is external reasons to the failure ofVanke anti - acquisition strategy, Vanke over - decentralized ownership structure and management power and otherimperfect internal governance mechanism is internal reasons to Vanke anti - acquisition strategy failure. Accordingto the above conclusions, we puts forward some policy suggestions such as strengthening the government supervision,perfecting the anti - acquisition legal system, establishing the double - stock structure and improving the corporategovernance mechanism.

关 键 词：控制权之争 反收购策略 股权结构 治理结构 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]