批发价激励下的供应链运营决策与最优付款选择研究  

Operational Decision and Optimal Choice of Payment to a Supply Chain Based on Wholesale Price Incentive

作　　者：沈建男[1] 邵晓峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2018年第1期103-110,共8页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372106)

摘　　要：为寻求企业间货款支付的协调统一,在市场需求不确定的情形下,针对由单个制造商与单个零售商组成的二级供应链,且交易过程中存在3种付款方式可供选择,构建基于PUSH交易模式的供应链动态博弈模型,设计不同付款方式下的批发价激励机制,提出有无批发价激励下的供应链运营策略与期望利润,分析零售商与制造商最优付款的选择条件。研究表明:无批发价激励下零售商肯定会选择延期付款,而批发价激励下零售商与制造商主要依据批发价、无风险利率、生产与销售周期等参数,并且双方有比较相近的最优付款选择,揭示批发价激励能部分协调货款交付。In order to seek the ways to coordinate the payment between downstream and upstream enterprise. So there exists a supply chain consisting one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand and three payment terms, this study establishes supply chain dynamic game model based on Push newsvendor. Wholesale price incentive is designed according to different payment. Operational strategies and revenue for each other with or without wholesale price incentive are present, and the conditions of optimal payment are analyzed. The results show that retailer actually chooses to delay payment without wholesale price incentive. But retailer and manufacturer select optimal payment on the basis of wholesale price, risk-free interest, production cycle and sales cycle with wholesale price incentive, and the optimal payment between them is most similar, which verifies wholesale price incentive partly coordinate the optimal payment.

关 键 词：付款方式 批发价激励 运营策略 协调 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]