PPP项目中政府补偿与社会资本投资运营决策研究  

Impacts of Government Subsidies on Investment and Operation Decisions in Public-private Partnerships

作　　者：曹启龙 周晶[2] 盛昭瀚[2] 

机构地区：[1]常州大学商学院,江苏常州213164 [2]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2017年第12期1-8,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目<重大基础设施工程决策分析与决策管理研究>(71390521)

摘　　要：从社会资本的视角出发研究了政府部门补偿额度的大小对PPP项目中社会资本投资决策和运营决策的影响,通过将政府部门的补偿分为不同的等级,并结合实物期权理论建立模型求解出了不同等级下社会资本投资的临界值和退出的临界值。算例分析表明在考虑政府补偿的情形下,项目经营阶段社会资本退出的临界值远低于其经营成本,项目投资阶段社会资本投资的临界值严格大于其退出的临界值,并且随着政府补偿额度的增加,投资和退出的临界值严格递减。This paper analyzes the impact of government subsidies on the investor＇ s investment and operation decisions in public-private partnership projects from the view of the private investor. By dividing the government subsidies into three classes and by employing the real option theory to build models, the investment threshold and exit threshold are obtained. The case study demonstrates that the exit threshold is lower than the project＇ s cost under operation period and the investment threshold is higher than the exit threshold under investment threshold when subsidies are taken into account. Moreover, as government subsidies increase, so the threshold of invest- ment and exit would decrease strictly.

关 键 词：公私合营 政府补偿 实物期权 投资运营 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]