引导新能源贸易的多方复合博弈及策略分析  

The Multi Party Compound Game and Strategy Analysis of International Energy Trade

作　　者：王文[1] 

机构地区：[1]集美大学航海学院,福建厦门361021

出　　处：《系统科学学报》2017年第4期110-115,共6页Chinese Journal of Systems Science

基　　金：福建省自然科学基金项目(2015J05138):世界能源供需结构对能源航运格局的生成与支配研究

摘　　要：通过能源贸易博弈主体行为分析,提出监管机构、贸易双方的动态博弈及承运人单向混合策略博弈构成的多方复合博弈模型,给出其一般情况、考虑超额排放及排放交易时博弈各方不同策略的收益矩阵,分析结果监管机构采用强制性政策的收益总是多于鼓励性政策,有超额排放及排放交易时买方和监管机构的收益由买方使用的能源种类决定,承运人应按承运某种能源收益较大的概率调整其运力比例。由新旧能源的效益差可得强制性政策的有效临界值,但新旧能源能效比、市场消化条件、效用类型等因素都会影响政策的有效程度。The model of multi party compound game is put forward, which is composed of the dynamtrading is given. The results show that the income from mandatory policy is always more than that from encouraging policy for the regulator. Buyer and regulator＇s earnings are determined by the type of energy used by the buyer when there are excess emissions and emissions trading. The carrier shall adjust the cor- responding proportion of the carrying capacity according to the probability of more income from carrying some kind of energy. The effective critical value of the mandatory policy can be obtained by the benefit difference between the old and new energy sources, but the effectiveness of the policy will be affected by the efficiency ratio of the old and the new energy, market digestion conditions, utility type and other factors.

关 键 词：能源贸易 多方博弈 能源结构 能源政策 排放监管 

分 类 号：N949[自然科学总论—系统科学]