官员腐败、铸币税与经济增长的非线性关系研究  

Study of Nonlinear Relationship Between Official Corruption, Seigniorage and Economic Growth

作　　者：陆前进[1] 卢庆杰 庞盈盈[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学国际金融系 [2]上海期货交易所

出　　处：《南大商学评论》2017年第2期35-69,共35页Nanjing Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(编号:70673011、71173042);教育部后期项目(编号:12JHQ030);上海市哲学社会科学规划项目(编号:2016BJB001);复旦大学理论经济学Ⅰ类高峰项目的资助

摘　　要：本文认为铸币税和经济增长之间存在＂倒U型＂的拉弗曲线关系,并探讨了官员腐败对经济增长以及经济增长拉弗曲线的影响。理论分析以MIU跨期均衡模型为基础,得出铸币税税率与经济增长之间存在拉弗曲线关系,并且官员腐败对经济有抑制作用。数值模拟展示了铸币税税率与经济增长的倒U型曲线,同时腐败会降低该曲线。实证研究也证实了上述观点,且官员腐败还会使最优的铸币税税率变大。经济增长受多方面因素影响,而本文重点分析官员腐败对铸币税,以及铸币税税率和经济增长之间拉弗曲线关系的影响,从而在经济层面探讨反腐政策和经济增长的关系。This paper argues that there is the ＂inverted U＂ laffer curve relationship between seigniorage and economic growth, and official corruption will influence economic growth as well as the Laffer curve. Theoretically, based on the MIU intertemporal equilibrium model, we draw the conclusion that the relationship between seigniorage rate and economic growth is indeed inverted U shape, just like the Laffer curve. What＇s more, official corruption will worsen the economy. Numerical simulation and empirical research also confirm this point of view, and also indicate that official corruption will enlarge the optimal seigniorage tax rate. Economic growth is influenced by many factors, and this paper focuses on analyzing official corruption＇s influence on seigniorage and the laffer curve relationship between seigniorage rate and economic growth, to explore the relationship between the anti-corruption policy and economic growth from the view of economic aspect.

关 键 词：腐败 铸币税 拉弗曲线 经济增长 

分 类 号：D262.6[政治法律—政治学] F124.1[政治法律—中共党史] F812.42[经济管理—世界经济]