私人董事会下股权众筹的收益分享激励  

Revenue Sharing Incentive for Equity Crowdfunding under Peer Advisory Group

作　　者：常焙筌 厉无畏[1] 朱映锦 

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051 [2]康奈尔大学运营研究与信息工程学院,美国纽约州伊萨卡14850

出　　处：《复旦学报（自然科学版）》2017年第6期739-746,共8页Journal of Fudan University：Natural Science

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(CUSF-DH-D-2016060)

摘　　要：我国股权众筹目前面临的最大挑战是信息风险和信任风险,为了解决这一问题,"私人董事会+领投+跟投"这一创新模式的引入为众筹的安全性提供了一定保障.实现项目发起人的项目创意保护、众筹平台监管透明、投资人信息和支付安全的信用保障,涉及到操作、融资透明度、资金管控、信息和支付安全.本文尝试以我国股权众筹创新的"私人董事会+领投+跟投"机制为基础,探讨基于私人董事会的股权众筹模型在博弈理论中的实际应用.To guarantee the safety of crowdfunding in China,the mechanism of ＂Peer Advisory Group＋Lead Invest＋With Invest＂is introduced innovatively,mainly focusing on solving the problems of information risk and trust risk,which are the biggest challenges facing the crowd sourced equity funding.This paper aims to preserve the creativity of the projects initiated by entrepreneur,to supervise the information disclosure of crowdfunding platform,and to protect the safety of investorsinformation and payment.Here,we attempt to discuss the practical application of equity crowdfunding in game theory,based on the mechanism of＂Peer Advisory Group＋Lead Invest＋With Invest＂under the supervision of private board.

关 键 词：股权众筹 私人董事会 领投+跟投 博弈论 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济]