移动补贴市场运营商定价策略与收益分配  

Pricing strategy and revenue allocation between service providers in mobile sponsored markets

作　　者：苏辉[1] 谭崎 赵乙 徐恪[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学计算机科学与技术系计算机网络技术研究所

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2018年第1期8-13,共6页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(61472212);国家科技重大专项(2015ZX03003004);国家“八六三”高技术项目(2013AA013302,2015AA015601);欧盟第七框架玛丽居里国际科研人员交流计划(FP7-PEOPLE-2013-IRSES-610524)

摘　　要：虚拟网络运营商（ISP）的出现改变了移动互联网市场中运营商之间的连接和经济关系。该文建立博弈模型,分别在合作情况下和非合作情况下,使用博弈理论分析了移动补贴市场中流量分配、运营商之间的定价关系及收益的变化,提出了一种在运营商之间分配收益的机制,并通过Nash讨价还价解的方法对收益分配因子进行了优化和求解。结果表明：运营商之间的定价随补贴的增加而升高,该文所提出的收益分配机制能促使运营商自发将其优化目标调整为社会福利最大化。The virtual Internet service providers （ISPs） have changed the connection and economic relationships among ISPs in mobile Internet sponsored markets. Game theory is used to develop a model to study the competition among ISPs and to analyze data allocation, pricing and utility issues for cooperative and non-cooperative games for ISPs in the mobile sponsored market. This paper also presents a revenue allocation mechanism and solves for the optimal allocation factor using the Nash bargaining solution. The results show that the price difference between ISPs increases with the sponsored level and the revenue allocation mechanism encourages the ISPs to adjust their optimized purposes to maximize the social welfare.

关 键 词：移动互联网 补贴市场 虚拟运营商 定价 收益分配 

分 类 号：TM351[电气工程—电机]