考虑移动群智感知用户类型的激励机制设计  

User type-based incentive mechanism design in participatory sensing system

作　　者：林烨婷 陈忠辉[1] 冯心欣[1] 郑海峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]福州大学物理与信息工程学院,福建福州350116

出　　处：《信息技术与网络安全》2018年第1期101-105,共5页Information Technology and Network Security

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(U1405251);国家自然科学基金(61601126);福建省自然科学基金(2016J01299)

摘　　要：群智感知是一种招募移动设备用户完成数据采集、云计算等任务的感知模式。但在不对称信息场景下,因云平台无法观测到用户私人类型信息而处于不利地位,产生不能有效利用用户、导致自身利益被削减的问题。利用基于契约理论的群智感知激励机制,针对不同类型用户,在对称信息场景和不对称信息场景下,分别设计了最优契约,并提出了最优方案不等式,有效地最大化云平台的收益,激励了用户披露其私人信息。最后利用仿真验证了最优契约,并讨论了噪声、成本、分界线对云平台收益的影响。Crowdsensing is a recruitment of mobile device users to complete data collection, Cloud computing and other tasks of the perception mode. But in the incomplete information scenario, the platform can not observe the private type information of users, and utilize users effective- ly, resulting in interests cut. In this paper, the contract based incentive mechanism applied to crowdsensing is proposed to design the optimal contract which is for different types of users, under the complete information scenario and the incomplete information scenario. Meanwhile the optimal scheme inequality is proposed, effectively maximizing the benefits of the platform, and motivating agents to disclose their private infor- mation. Finally, we evaluate our optimal contract and discuss the influence of noise, cost and boundary on platform.

关 键 词：群智感知 契约理论 用户类型 委托人 代理人 

分 类 号：TN929.5[电子电信—通信与信息系统]