“互联网+”养老平台供给模式的选择与优化——基于动/静态博弈分析  

The Selection and Optimization of the Supply Model of the “Internet + ”—— Pension Platform Based on Dynamic and Static Game Analysis

作　　者：睢党臣[1] 曹献雨 

机构地区：[1]陕西师范大学国际商学院,陕西西安710119

出　　处：《陕西师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2018年第1期74-82,共9页Journal of Shaanxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"‘互联网+’养老服务体系生成机制与培育路径选择研究"(16BSH131);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目"互联网+养成服务体系生成及实现机制研究"(2017TS063)

摘　　要："互联网+"养老平台供给效率低下,严重阻碍"互联网+"养老的顺利实施,不利于提升养老服务质量与效率,无法缓解养老服务供求矛盾。从"互联网+"养老平台供给角度出发,运用动/静态博弈相结合的方法从理论和现实两方面分析政府完全供给模式、私人自发参与供给模式和私人有偿参与供给模式下政府与私人企业形成的均衡格局,从中发现"互联网+"养老平台供给方面存在的问题,并针对问题从供给数量、供给结构、供给质量3个方面入手找出提高供给效率的优化路径。The supply of ＂Internet ＋ ＂pension platform is inefficient,which seriously hinders the smooth implementation of the ＂Internet ＋ ＂pension and is unfavorable to improve pension service quality and efficiency.This is unable to ease the endowment service supply and demand contradiction. From the supply of ＂Internet ＋ ＂endowment platform＇s perspective,the government＇s complete supply model,the private voluntary participation mode and the private paid participation mode are analyzed by using the method of dynamic and static game analysis in theory and reality. The problems can be found and put forward to the path optimization of improving the supply efficiency by expanding the supply quantity,optimizing supply structure and strengthening the supply quality.

关 键 词：社会养老 “互联网+” 智慧养老 准公共产品 供给模式 养老服务 

分 类 号：C913.6[经济管理]