官员晋升压力与企业创新  

Politicians' promotion pressure and firm innovation

作　　者：王砾[1] 孔东民[1,2] 代昀昊[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院,武汉430074 [2]中南财经政法大学金融学院,武汉430073

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2018年第1期111-126,共16页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71772178;71702061;71372130);国家社会科学基金重大项目(17ZDAO73);中央组织部"万人计划"青年拔尖人才计划资助项目

摘　　要：以2000年~2012年A股上市公司为样本,选取地方官员晋升这一独特视角,实证考察地方官员的晋升压力对企业创新活动的影响,并分别从企业产权性质、地区市场化程度和企业政治关联三个维度对这一影响进行了更深层次的多角度研究.研究结果表明,地方官员晋升前期,企业创新数量和质量都会显著降低,这种抑制作用在地方国有企业、市场化程度更低和有政治关联的企业中表现更为显著.扩展检验发现,企业在官员晋升前会通过慈善捐赠而非寻租的方式与政府建立联系,从而进一步挤出创新.本文研究不仅从微观层面为揭示官员晋升的经济后果提供了新的经验证据,而且对我国深化科技体制改革和促进企业技术创新具有清晰的政策意义.Choosing the A-share listed firms in China during 2000 and 2012 as a study sample, the paper studies empirically local government promotion and its influence on firm innovation. Meanwhile, this influence is analyzed in detail from three dimensions of firm characters： property rights, the degree of marketization, and the firms＇ political connections. It is found that the incentives created by the impending promotion of local politicians will reduce the firms＇ innovation quantity and quality. The negative effect is stronger if the firm is local state-owned, or if the city＇ s marketization degree is lower, or if the firm has a political connection. After a further examination, it is found that the firm would establish a political relationship by charitable donations rather than rent-seeking, consequently to further squeeze out innovation. The results not only enrich the re- search on the impact of impending political promotion, but also offer clear policy implications on deepening the scientific and technological system reforms and accelerating firms＇ technological innovation.

关 键 词：官员晋升压力 企业创新 产权 市场化程度 政治关联 

分 类 号：F20[经济管理—国民经济] F276